This paper outlines a distributed GDSS suitable to be used over the Internet, based on the VIP Analysis methodology and software. VIP Analysis incorporates complementary approaches to deal with the aggregation of multicriteria performances by means of an additive value function under imprecise information. This proposed GDSS intends to support a decision panel forming a democratic decision unit, whose members wish to reach a final decision in a choice problem, based on consensus or on some majority rule. Its purpose is not to impose an aggregated model from the individual ones. Rather, the GDSS is designed to reflect to each member the consequences of his/her inputs, confronting them with analogous reflections of the group membersÕ inputs. We propose aggregation procedures to provide a reflection of the groupÕs inputs to each of its members, and an architecture for a GDSS implementing these procedures.
Introduction
Group decision processes and negotiation processes constitute very complex human activities. Improving their understanding justifies multidisciplinary studies, based on cognitive psychology, organizational science, sociology, political science, etc. Furthermore, the development of computer-based support tools for these activities is rooted not only in communication/information technologies and OR/management science models, but also in human and organizational behavior studies.
This paper discusses how an existing standalone decision support tool -VIP Analysis (Dias and Cl ımaco, 2000a ) -may evolve to become a distributed group decision support system (GDSS) suitable to support decision making via the Internet. We address the extension to a group decision-making setting of the VIP Analysis methodology, and propose a GDSS architecture for the extension of the VIP Analysis software.
We will now typify what we mean by group decision in opposition to negotiation processes, discussing some major contrasting characteristics. First, the fundamental objectives are common in group decisions, while in negotiation they are opposed. Secondly, the set of alternatives is enumerated in group decisions (although it can evolve during the communication/decision process), while in negotiation alternatives (proposals) are sequentially presented by the parties and are to a great extent interactively generated, making concessions and/or accommodating some needs of the other parties. This peculiar interdependence among actors ''rather than conflict, distinguishes negotiation from other forms of decision making'' (Kersten and Cray, 1996) . Thirdly, in group decisions constraints are discussed, sharing information in order to foster interactive learning among the actors, profiting of their own experiences and of their diversified cultural roots, and contributing to reduce uncertainty and ambiguity, while in negotiation constraints are hidden (e.g., a sales target, or a purchase budget). Furthermore, in negotiation the values and beliefs of the parties are also hidden, being frequently unconsciously adopted. Fourthly, voting is a possibility of setting divergence in group decisions, but not in negotiations, where mediation or arbitration may be needed to approximate the parties. Negotiation involves competition while group decisions are mostly based in deliberative processes. Finally, leaving the group is not usually an option in group decisions, while abandoning the negotiation (''walking away'') is often an option. In fact, the quality of the decisions of a group strongly depends on the cohesion of the group.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the methodology of VIP Analysis and its extension, and discusses how it may be used in group decision settings. Section 3 introduces an illustrative example. In Section 4 we propose an architecture for a GDSS intended to support distributed decision making, based on the methodology presented before. Finally, we offer some conclusions and indicate some future research paths.
Methodology

Basic VIP analysis concepts
We will first overview the current VIP Analysis methodology and software (Dias and Cl ımaco, 2000a , describe it in more detail). The purpose of VIP Analysis is to support the evaluation of a discrete set of alternatives, in order to choose the most preferred one, according to a multiattribute additive value function (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976) . The global value of an alternative a i is a sum of its values at the n criteria ðv 1 ða i Þ; . . . ; v n ða i ÞÞ, weighted by n scaling constants k ¼ ðk 1 ; . . . ; k n Þ that indirectly reflect the importance of the criteria: V ða j ; kÞ ¼ X n j¼1 k j v j ða j Þ; with X n j¼1 k j ¼ 1 and k j P 0:
One of the most difficult parts of the decision aid process is setting the values of the scaling constants, since these parameters will reflect the DMsÕ values and trade-offs (e.g., how much would you be willing to lose in attribute ''cost'' to gain one unit in attribute ''risk of accident''?). Indeed, not only DMs may find it hard to provide precise figures about their preferences, but also these preferences may change as the decision aid process evolves. Moreover, the procedures used to elicit the values of the scaling constants (e.g., see Von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986 ) may require more time and patience than some DMs can spare. Finally, in group decision situations the opinions and preferences of the DMs diverge frequently. To overcome these difficulties, VIP Analysis proposes to advance in the decision process with variable interdependent parameters. This means that instead of requiring precise values for the scaling constants, it asks for intervals and linear constraints on these values. For instance, a DM (or a group of DMs) may be doubtful about setting k 1 ¼ 0:2 and k 2 ¼ 0:1 (these precise values) but may find it easy to agree that k 1 > k 2 . This kind of information is often designated as poor, imprecise, incomplete, or partial information (e.g., see Weber, 1987; Dias and Cl ımaco, 2000a) . The constraints usually stem from imprecise answers from the DM (e.g. providing an interval for the trade-off rate between two criteria) or from holistic judgments about alternatives that the DM is able to compare (e.g. a 1 is preferred to a 2 ). When VIP Analysis is used to support a fully cooperative group of DMs meeting face to face, reaching a consensus on the constraints to insert in the model can be difficult. However, we argue that reaching a consensus on precise values is much more difficult.
Let T denote the set of all combinations of parameter values that satisfy all the constraints inserted. We assume that the system of constraints would be consistent; otherwise, T would be an empty set. Once T is defined, VIP Analysis may be used to discover robust conclusions (those that hold for every combination in T ) and to identify which results are more affected by the imprecision in the parameter values (the results that vary more). The results produced by VIP Analysis from a set T of acceptable combinations of values for the importance parameters and a set A ¼ fa 1 ; . . . ; a m g of alternatives include the following:
• A range of values for each alternative a i 2 A, from minfV ða i ; kÞ : k 2 T g to maxfV ða i ; kÞ : k 2 T g. If the highest possible value for an alternative a x is always less than the lowest possible value for an alternative a y , then the first alternative could be discarded.
• The highest difference of value for each ordered pair of alternatives ða i ; a j Þ 2 A 2 , i.e., maxfV ða i ; kÞ À V ða j ; kÞ : k 2 T g. If the maximum difference is negative or null then V ða j ; kÞ P V ða i ; kÞ 8k 2 T , which we denote as a j Da i (a j ''dominates'' a i ). If the maximum difference does not exceed a tolerance parameter e, then V ða j ; kÞ P V ða i ; kÞ À e 8k 2 T , which we denote as a j D e a i (a j ''quasi-dominates'' a i with tolerance e).
• For each alternative a i 2 A, the ''maximum regret'' associated with choosing it, i.e. the maximum difference of value considering the alternatives that may have a higher value than a i given T :
Regret max ða i Þ ¼ maxfRegretða i ; kÞ : k 2 T g ði ¼ 1; . . . ; mÞ: ¼ maxfmaxfV ða j ; kÞ : j ¼ 1; . . . ; mg À V ða i ; kÞ : k 2 T g ði ¼ 1; . . . ; mÞ:
If Regret max ða i Þ 6 0 then we can say that a i is ''optimal''; if Regret max ða i Þ 6 e we can say that a i is ''quasioptimal'' with tolerance e.
Extension of the methodology for explicit aggregation of individual views
VIP Analysis, as presented in the previous section, can be a useful tool to support a group of DMs meeting face-to-face around a computer, sharing an imprecisely defined model, therefore agreeing on the robust conclusions. The outputs of VIP Analysis may allow the decision process to progress, as the DMs learn about the model and the problem, postponing the elicitation questions they find difficult to answer, or prone to generate conflict. For instance, they may not agree on precise values for the scaling constants, but may agree on a ranking of those constants (e.g. k 1 P k 2 P k 3 P k 4 ). Or they may merely agree on a partial ranking (e.g. k 1 P k 2 ; k 1 P k 3 and k 3 P k 4 ). In any case, VIP Analysis provides results that may allow to eliminate some alternatives or to highlight the most promising ones. Furthermore, the results can be used to direct the elicitation of further information with the purpose of progressively reducing the imprecision (e.g. ''can alternative a x really attain such a high value?'' ''can all DMs agree that a x is worse than a y ?'').
Nevertheless, we are aware of the limitations of VIP Analysis as a standalone tool. Namely, it excludes settings where the DMs are spatially distributed, it does not allow DMs to analyze the problem individually, and it implicitly requires an a priori aggregation of the different models that the DMs may have. We will now address methodological extensions concerning aggregation support. VIP Analysis may be seen as a tool that analyses the consequences in terms of output of the imprecise information taken as input. In particular, it is not normative to a point where it recommends which alternative is the best one given the inputs. In a group decision context, we intend to keep this attitude, meaning that a GDSS based on VIP Analysis should neither propose (upon aggregating) a final ranking of the alternatives, nor impose an aggregated model from the individual ones. Rather, the GDSS will be designed to reflect (like a mirror) to each member the consequences of his/her inputs, confronting them with analogous images of the group membersÕ inputs. The aggregation procedures will hence be used only to provide a reflection of the groupÕs inputs to each of its members, showing all the results that are compatible with the inputs provided, but without pointing to a particular result as being the groupÕs choice.
Let us consider a group of K DMs who are collaborating to recommend a solution to a decision problem, each one having a set T k of acceptable values for the parameters (k ¼ 1; . . . ; K). Individual perspectives may be aggregated either at the input level or at the output level. When aggregation occurs at the input level (Fig. 1) , an operator f ðÁÞ aggregates the individual T k (k ¼ 1; . . . ; K) into a set T of values accepted by the group, whereas an operator eðÁÞ yields all the results of the method R compatible with T . When aggregation occurs at the output level (Fig. 2) , the operator eðÁÞ yields the set of results of the method compatible with each DMÕs T k , whereas an operator hðÁÞ aggregates the individual sets of results R k into a set of results R. The aggregation performed by f ðÁÞ and hðÁÞ does usually consist in averaging, minimizing a distance measure, voting, etc.
A review of previous research in a similar setting
Before trying to explore the consequences of imprecision in the framework of the aggregation support for group settings using VIP Analysis, we will now outline some previously proposed approaches. Taking into account the context of VIP analysis, this review is limited to approaches based on additive value functions and imprecise information for group decision making. Kim and Ahn (1997) propose a two steps approach. The first step is based on the imprecise (or incomplete) information provided by the decision makers and consists in the articulation of their preferences leading to individual results. This is based on the calculation of maximum/minimum expected values, strict/weak dominance values, or ordinal ranking. In a second step a procedure to aggregate the preferences of all group members is proposed, where the aggregation function is a difference of weighted sums of each pair of actions, i.e., the group consensus is pursued from the analysis of pairwise dominance relations between pairs of alternatives. Kim and Ahn (1999) propose another approach starting again by the calculation of individual results, i.e. strict or weak dominance relations are calculated by solving a series of LP problems. Here the utility function which aggregates the individual results is approached using as inputs the individual weak dominance relations and it is built taking explicitly into account the individual preference strength. In fact, it is based on the net preference intensity of each alternative defined as the difference between the degree a alternative is preferred to all the others and that of the others being preferred to it. Kim and Han (1999) propose a different approach. They assume imprecise information in the individual utilities and in the weights associated to each additive value function as well as in the weights related to a group utility function. Also here in a first step preferences are aggregated through weak/strict dominance relations based on the calculation of max/min expected values. It is suggested the use of a probabilistic measure, which is an indicator for the preference strength between alternatives. A second step, dedicated to the enrichment of the group consensus, is also based on dominance relations. The elicitation of complementary information from the decision makers required by the second step is made interactively and facilitated by the probabilistic measure above referred to. A mathematical programming model is proposed to obtain the dominance relations. propose still another approach to situations where the available information is imprecise. Here, a range-type representation for utilities is used. In a first step, the utility range for each member of the group is obtained by maximizing and minimizing, subject to constraints, the individual utility functions. In a second step, the aggregation of the individual ranges yields the so-called total range and agreed range of the groupÕs preferences. The first corresponds to the intersection and the second to the union of the group membersÕ ranges. Then, the decision makers try interactively to reduce the gap between total range and agreed range. Finally, a weak domination relation based on pairwise comparison is built. If any of the decision makers is not yet satisfied, the process is repeated taking into account the information elicited previously.
Bana e Costa (1986) considers, in the framework of additive value functions, the actors express different, and usually conflicting, levels of acceptance for the weights and proposes a methodology to enable the decision maker to take into account these differences in the evaluation of the relative importance of the criteria. Quoting the author: ''The methodology proposes an Overall Compromise Criterion which ''corrects'' the average sum aggregation of the performances by an Acceptability Index combining all actors individual preferences''. The group Acceptability Index is calculated using a joint density function. The process enables to identify the least conflicting alternative.
Bana e Costa (1990) considers imprecise information regarding the different actors criterion preference information. He proposes a two steps approach. First, the preferences representation is based on the definition of outranking relations. Secondly, the incomparability between pairs of alternatives is progressively reduced, in a compensatory framework. Thus, the use of the concept of Acceptability Index (Bana e Costa, 1986) , is combined with a new outranking approach designated by the author as Outweight Analysis.
Individual perspectives aggregated at the methodÕs output level. Lahdelma et al. (1998) developed SMAA -stochastic multiobjective acceptability analysis. This approach is adequate to group decision settings, and considers that inaccurate or uncertain inputs can be represented as probability distributions. Key issues of this method are: exploring the weight space, an extension of the concept of acceptability index for each alternative (Bana e Costa, 1986), measuring the variety of the valuations supporting it, together with the definition of a central weight vector for each alternative, as the centre of gravity of weight space sub-region associated to it. The idea is to identify good compromise alternatives in the framework of jointly accepted (by the DMs) additive utility functions shape. Furthermore, a Confidence Factor is used in order to conclude about the level of accuracy of the input data for supporting a decision. In Hokkanen et al. (1998) and in Lahdelma and Salminen (2001) extensions of the SMAA are proposed.
In most of the approaches presented here, the explicit calculation of the individual results precedes the search of group aggregated results (and this can be obtained by the application of an operator, previously designated by hðÁÞ). Some of these approaches result in a ranking of the alternatives, whereas others are not so normative.
Methodology behind VIP-G
Keeping VIP AnalysisÕ attitude of exploring the consequences of imprecision, it seems appropriate to consider f ðÁÞ or hðÁÞ (Figs. 1 and 2) as the set operations \ (intersection) or [ (union), as proposed by Dias and Cl ımaco (2000b) When using intersections in f ðÁÞ (hðÁÞ), set T (set R, respectively) will gather the input values (results, respectively) that are acceptable by all the DMs, whereas if the union operation is used in f ðÁÞ (hðÁÞ), the DMs will know the input values (results) that are not considered by any of them. In the first case, there is consensus on what to include; in the second case, there is consensus on what to exclude.
Extending these possibilities, we also consider an ''a -majority'' aggregation operator, where a combination of parameter values or a result are considered acceptable if accepted by at least aK DMs (formally, this can be seen as a continuous-space extension of Aizerman and AleskerovÕs (1983) ''k-majority'' operators for social choice functions). This is equivalent to voting, for every conceivable input (or result) if the group accepts it or not. The parameter a may vary between 1=K (corresponding to the operator [) and 1 (corresponding to the operator \), possibly in increments of 1=K. Indeed, if there are four DMs, the required ''majorities'' can be 1/4, 2/4, 3/4 and 4/4: Any value in the interval [1=4; 2=4[ yields the same as a value of 1/4, etc.
If the aggregation is performed at the input level ( Fig. 1) , a possible ''a -majority'' aggregation operator could be
This means that a combination t (a vector) of parameter values is considered acceptable (i.e. as belonging to T ðaÞ ) if at least a Á K DMs include it in their acceptable sets. As a particular case, when a ¼ 1, then t 2 T a if all DMs include t in their sets. When a ¼ 1=K, then for t 2 T ðaÞ to hold it is enough that one DM includes t in his/her set. Hence
The purpose of computing T ðaÞ is not to impose a ''consensus'' model to be used thereafter, but to provide some feedback to the individual DMs, who may confront their private model with models acceptable by the group (by all members if a ¼ 1, by at least one member if a ¼ 1=K). However, since the union of polyhedral sets is not usually a polyhedron, T ðaÞ (a > 1=K) would not be a valid input for VIP Analysis. Hence, a more appropriate choice would be to take the convex hull of T ðaÞ instead. Unfortunately, the computations to compute the convex hull may be complex and time consuming (Avis et al., 1997) . It may happen that T ðaÞ becomes void, particularly as a approaches 1, although this should not happen frequently if there is no strong conflict among the DMs. In such cases, the individual polytopes might be changed either by discussing the constraints or by automatically dropping or loosening constraints in a fair manner.
Performing the aggregation at the output level (Fig. 2 ) is simpler and, since there is a many-to-one correspondence between parameter values and results (e.g., there are many combinations of parameter values yielding the same alternative as the best one), it is more likely to facilitate consensus. A possible ''amajority'' aggregation operator could be
This means that a result r (a number) is considered acceptable (i.e. as belonging to R ðaÞ ) if at least a Á K DMs include it in their result sets. As particular cases, we have a ¼ 1 (all DMs include it) and a ¼ 1=K (at least one DM includes it):
It may happen that R ðaÞ becomes void, which implies that T ðaÞ is also void. However, there may exist situations where T ðaÞ is void but not R ðaÞ . The purpose of computing the set R ðaÞ is not to impose a ''consensus'' set of results, but to provide some feedback to the individual DMs, who may confront their private results with the ones accepted by the group (all the members if a ¼ 1, at least one member if a ¼ 1=K, or some required support in between this extremes). The conclusions that are drawn from R ðaÞ need some careful interpretation. For instance, consider a group composed of three DMs evaluating an alternative a i . The first DM accepts a convex set of possible input values (T 1 ), which (let us suppose) yield minfV ða i ; kÞ : k 2 T g ¼ 0:4 and maxfV ða i ; kÞ : k 2 T g ¼ 0:65. From the convexity of T 1 and the linearity of V ðÁÞ, the interval of possible results corresponding to T 1 is V ða i Þ 2 ½0:4; 0:65. Let us further suppose that the set T 2 of possible input values accepted by the second DM yielded the interval V ða i Þ 2 ½0:5; 0:7, whereas the third DM reached the interval V ða i Þ 2 ½0:6; 0:75 (see Fig. 3 ). In this case, R ð1Þ would yield that V ða i Þ 2 ½0:6; 0:65 (i.e. values acceptable by all DMs), R ð2=3Þ would yield that V ða i Þ 2 ½0:5; 0:7 (i.e. values acceptable by at least 2 out of 3 DMs), and R ð1=3Þ would yield that V ða i Þ 2 ½0:4; 0:75 (i.e. values acceptable by at least one DM). Now, it is not reasonable to say that the group unanimously considers that V ða i Þ is not less than 0.6, just because the intersection R ð1Þ yields that V ða i Þ 2 ½0:6; 0:65. Indeed, only the third DM supports that conclusion. What we could say (from R ð1=3Þ ) is that the group unanimously agrees that V ða i Þ cannot be less than 0.4. This approach to aggregating the outputs may hence be seen from another perspective while keeping the same idea. Let us consider C k (k ¼ 1; . . . ; K) as sets of individual conclusions (propositions) of the following types: V ða i Þ P x; V ða i Þ 6 x; Regretða i Þ 6 x; and V ða i Þ À V ða j Þ 6 x.
The ''a-majority'' aggregation operator (a 2 ½1=K; 1) yields a set of conclusions acceptable by the group as follows:
This means that a conclusion c (a proposition) is considered acceptable (i.e. as belonging to C ðaÞ ) if at least a Á K DMs reach the same conclusion (or a conclusion that implies it; e.g., the conclusion V ða i Þ P 0:8 implies the conclusion V ða i Þ P 0:7). As particular cases, we have a ¼ 1 (all DMs reach a conclusion) and a ¼ 1=K (at least one DM reaches it).
There is a direct correspondence (a sort of duality) between sets C ðaÞ and R ð1Àaþ1=KÞ : the consequences in the first are drawn from the results in the latter, and vice versa. In particular, if we know from R ð1=KÞ that for a given variable vðÁÞ all values in an interval ½x; y are acceptable by at least one DM, then we will know that the conclusions ''vðÁÞ cannot be lower than x '' and ''vðÁÞ cannot be higher than y'' are robust conclusions accepted by all the group (i.e. belong to C ð1Þ ).
It may also be of interest for a member to determine the aggregated results of a sub-group G. Namely, G may correspond to the group formed by all members except him/her, or to a group of members that he/she perceives as interesting to isolate, e.g., because they are from the same department. The aggregation operator could be the following (with a 2 ½1=#G; 1 À 1=#G):
Similar definitions may be proposed concerning the inputs (T G a ) and results (R G a ). In the identification of quasi-dominated and quasi-optimal alternatives in standalone VIP Analysis, the DMs may consider a tolerance parameter e, as explained in Section 2.1. When upgrading to Group VIP Analysis, the DMÕs tolerance e may vary conjointly with the majority level a. Indeed, the DMs may inquire what alternatives are quasi-dominated according to an a-majority, noting that obtaining a quasi-dominance with a high value for a may require a high value for e (see an illustrative example in Section 3).
Each DM may analyze the consequences of imprecision (robust conclusions, variability of results) using his/her model and compare these consequences with C a (or C G a , for some G). This will provide each DM with an idea of where and by how much is he/she far from the groupÕs mainstream. An important aspect here is that each group member may vary the parameters a (and e) independently of the other members when performing private comparisons between his/her conclusions and C a (or C G a ). As an analogy, we may imagine a group of persons listening to the same music using headphones, but each one setting the volume lower or higher at his/her discretion.
Illustrative example
As an illustrative example for the methodology proposed in this paper, let us consider a classical problem analysed by Keeney and Nair in the 70s. We follow this study as reported by Roy and Bouyssou (1993) which consider additive instead of multiplicative aggregation. This decision situation concerned the choice of a location for a nuclear plant, faced by the Washington Public Power Supply System. Table 1 indicates the value of seven potential sites (to simplify the presentation we consider here only a subset of the alternatives) according to six value functions representing the criteria ''impact on human health'', ''loss of salmon'', ''impact on other species'', ''impact on economy'', ''aesthetics'' and ''cost''. Let us now imagine that there are four Decision Makers responsible for the decision, who agree on the single-criteria values in Table 1 , but have different opinions concerning the importance of each criterion.
Using an additive value function model, criteria importance is introduced in the form of scaling constants k 1 ; . . . ; k 6 , which define trade-off ratios among the value functions. For instance, if k 1 ¼ 3k 2 , this means that one unit of value in function v 2 ðÁÞ is worth three units of value in function v 1 ðÁÞ. Such values are often elicited by asking questions like ''how much would you be willing to lose in criterion ÔcostÕ to gain 0.1 units in criterion Ôimpact on human lifeÕ?''. Such questions are sometimes very hard to answer in a precise way. Hence, the possibility of answering in terms of acceptable values rather than a precise value may be particularly welcome.
In our hypothetical example, let us suppose that DMs start by placing few constraints on the values they consider acceptable, although some of them are less restrictive than others: DM1: k 6 P k 5 (i.e., an increase of an amount x in v 6 ðÁÞ is more attractive than a similar increase in v 5 ðÁÞ) DM2:
Furthermore, without loss of generality we consider also the ''normalization'' constraints k 1 þ Á Á Á þ k 6 ¼ 1 and k j P 0 (j ¼ 1; . . . ; 6). Let us define the set
The combinations of values for the scaling constants each one considers acceptable (at this stage) are
Given these four sets, VIP-G can compute the minimum and maximum global value V ða i Þ attainable by each alternative, which are depicted in The duality between results and conclusions can be observed: VIP-G also uses linear programming to compute the maximum advantage of each alternative a i against any other alternative a j , i.e., maxfV ða i ; kÞ À V ða j ; kÞ : k 2 T k g (k ¼ 1; . . . ; 4). The result obtained by each DM is presented in Table 3 (a)-(d). For instance, according to DM1, the maximum difference of value of a 1 over a 2 is 0.017. As another example, DM2 finds that the maximum difference of value of a 5 over a 1 is )0.046. This means that V ða 1 Þ is always higher than V ða 5 Þ given the constraints defining T 2 . Alternative a 5 is hence dominated according to DM2 (and DM3 and DM4) .
Some alternatives are not dominated, but quasi-dominated if the DMs allow for a small tolerance e. For instance, comparing a 1 and a 7 DMs conclude: DM1: maxfV ða 7 ; kÞ À V ða 1 ; kÞ : k 2 T 1 g ¼ 0:025; hence, a 1 D 0:025 a 7 (a 1 quasi-dominates a 7 with a tolerance of 0.025, according to DM1); DM2: maxfV ða 7 ; kÞ À V ða 1 ; kÞ : k 2 T 2 g ¼ 0:02; hence, a 1 D 0:02 a 7 ; DM3: maxfV ða 7 ; kÞ À V ða 1 ; kÞ : k 2 T 3 g < 0; hence a 1 Da 7 ; (a 1 dominates a 7 , according to DM3); DM4: maxfV ða 7 ; kÞ À V ða 1 ; kÞ : k 2 T 4 g ¼ 0:025; hence, a 1 D 0:025 a 7 .
This example shows the existing interplay between the tolerance e and the majority level a. If we denote by a i D eðaÞ a j the assertion ''a i quasi-dominates a j with tolerance e for a majority of a'', it is obvious that one may need a higher tolerance to obtain a wider majority supporting the conclusion, as illustrated in Fig. 4 : all four DMs agree that a 1 D 0:025ð4=4Þ a 7 ; two out of four DMs agree that a 1 D 0:02ð2=4Þ a 7 ; and one out of four DMs finds that a 1 dominates a 7 (Fig. 4) .
Let us imagine that all DMs agreed that a difference of 0.025 is negligible, i.e., they all accept a tolerance e ¼ 0:025. Then there would be a consensus that alternative a 7 was quasi-dominated and could be dropped Table 2 Minimum and maximum global value of the alternatives according to the different DMs from consideration for best choice. Analogously, a 4 and a 5 could also be unanimously discarded for e ¼ 0:025. Only DM1 prevents a 6 from being considered quasi-dominated. This alternative could be dropped if either the group accepted a 3/4 majority (a ¼ 0:75) or if DM1 accepted a tolerance of 0.085. As a matter of fact, if all DMs accepted a tolerance e ¼ 0:085, then a 2 would quasi-dominate all other alternatives: it is quasi-optimal for that tolerance for all the DMs. The methodology of VIP-G can hence be used to simplify the problem, as illustrated here, by a progressive elimination of the less interesting alternatives. Despite the lack of precision and imperfect con- sensus, that may be enough to see emerge a clear winner. Another role of this methodology should be to help each DM individually to provide more precise inputs at the same time he/she learns the results yielded by the other DMsÕ inputs. The group may readily appreciate where they are in agreement and where they most disagree, using this information to guide the process. However, VIP-G does not deal with the possibility of group members trying to manipulate results or sabotage consensus.
A GDSS architecture for VIP-G
Fig . 5 outlines the planned architecture for VIP-G. At its current development stage, VIP-G is able to process and aggregate the DMsÕ inputs, although it lacks the message passing and management capabilities that will allow its users to communicate effortlessly. It is planned to be a system based on a server to which several DMs may connect using the Internet. Indeed, this presents the advantage of allowing DMs to log in from virtually any place with access to the Internet.
Each DM uses a client application similar to the standalone VIP Analysis to perform private analyses, using the server to disclose and to gather information regarding the inputs he/she is considering and the results he/she is getting. The serverÕs role is to manage the database of the DMÕs inputs, broadcasting to all the DMs (i.e. to the client applications) the inputs collected from all of them (this waiting condition may be replaced by a calendar deadline). If anonymity is required, then the server may aggregate inputs and results, rather than sending the complete set of inputs or outputs to the DMs. In this case, the modules ''Inputs aggregation'' and ''Outputs aggregation'' might be located in the server, rather than the client. However, DMs would no longer be able to analyze the results of sub-groups of interest chosen by them (as proposed in Section 2.4).
The module (''Analysis of DMÕs own inputs'' module) corresponds to the use of VIP Analysis as if its user was the sole DM. The entire interaction occurs as when using the standalone version of VIP Analysis. Individual analyses may be confronted with the DMÕs view of any group GÕs current standings (''Analysis of groupÕs results'' module), namely the results R G a . This view is also personal, in that the DM may select the composition of G (whole group, whole group except him/her, etc.), and may privately set the parameters for the majority level (a) and the tolerance (e).
The results R G a are either simply aggregated by the module ''Outputs aggregation'', after collecting the outputs R k ðk 2 GÞ currently disclosed by GÕs members, or computed after the module ''Inputs aggregation'' collects and aggregates the inputs T k (k 2 G) currently disclosed by GÕs members. The conclusions C G a stem directly from the results, as explained in Section 2.4. Fig. 6 presents an example of the envisaged confrontation of an individual DMÕs perspective with the groupÕs aggregated perspective (the data are the same used in Section 3). The chart on the left corresponds to the private analysis of the DM using the client application. The chart on the right corresponds to the aggregated outputs of a group of interest defined by that DM, consisting of him/her plus three other DMs (i.e. K ¼ 4). This chart shows three ranges for each alternative: the outer one corresponds to R ð1=4Þ ðC ð1Þ Þ; the middle one (gray) corresponds to R ðaÞ ðC ð1Àaþ1=4Þ Þ, i.e. R ð3=4Þ ðC ð1=2Þ Þ; and the inner one (black) corresponds to R ð1Þ ðC ð1=4Þ Þ. Considering a 2 , for instance, the values in the range ½0:715; 0; 99 are obtainable by at least one from the four DMs (thus, all four agree that V ða 2 Þ P 0:715). The values in the range [0.732, 0.98] are obtained by at least three DMs (thus, 50% of the group agree that V ða 2 Þ P 0:732Þ. Finally, the values in the range [0.801, 0,976] are obtainable by all four DMs, but that means that only one of them would agree with the conclusion that V ða 2 Þ P 0:801. All this information is concisely presented. If the DM changes the required majority level (using the ''trackbar'') then the middle ranges (gray) will also change. They will coincide with the outer ranges (white) if the majority is set at the minimum R:25%/C:100%; they will coincide with the inner ranges (black) if the majority is set at the maximum R:100%/C:25%. Fig. 7 illustrates the presentation of the aggregation of pair-wise confrontation tables from a group of four DMs (the data are the same used in Section 3). Each cell presents three numbers: the one at the left top corresponds to corresponds to R ð1Þ C ð1=4Þ ; the one at the right top corresponds to R ð1=4Þ ðC ð1Þ Þ; the one at the middle bottom corresponds to R ð1=2Þ ðC ð3=4Þ Þ. For instance, the numbers corresponding to ða 1 ; a 2 Þ inform that: a 2 D ð1=4Þ a 1 , a 2 D 0;017ð3=4Þ a 1 , and a 2 D 0;017ð4=4Þ a 1 , i.e., if the DMs accept a tolerance of 0.017, then it is unanimous that a 1 is dominated by a 2 .
The module ''Structured and unstructured communications'' (Fig. 5) is responsible for all the communications between the userÕs working environment and the server. It receives structured messages about other DMsÕ sets R k (results-passing messages) and/or T k (models-passing messages), which are sent to the ''Outputs aggregation'' and ''Inputs aggregation'' modules, respectively. Moreover, it may send each userÕs sets R k and/or T k , when they wish to do so, to the other DMs. Depending on the characteristics of the group and the decision problem, a user-driven approach may suffice, or a facilitator may be needed to establish deadlines and to encourage participation. This module will also allow unstructured communications (as in e-mail) to enable informal discussions both about the decision problem (e.g., to defend an opinion, or to propose the exclusion of an alternative) and the decision-making process (e.g., to establish a deadline, or to prompt others to discuss an open issue).
Summary and future research
We started by reviewing VIP Analysis, as proposed by Dias and Cl ımaco. It is a methodology/software suitable to support a group of DMs meeting face-to-face around a computer, sharing an imprecisely defined model, therefore agreeing on the robust conclusions. The outputs of VIP Analysis may allow the decision process to progress, as the DMs learn about the model and the problem, postponing the elicitation questions they find difficult to answer, or prone to generate conflict. The software can be used to direct the elicitation of further information with the purpose of progressively reducing the imprecision, using these outputs to structure the dialogue among the DMs.
We have then proposed an extension that we named VIP-G, offering explicit aggregation tools, and allowing DMs to work privately and spatially distributed, while keeping the advantages mentioned in the previous paragraph. Each DM can perform private analyses, which may be confronted with his/her view of any group GÕs current standings, privately setting the parameters for the majority level (a) and the tolerance (e). VIP-G maintains the ''exploration'' philosophy of VIP Analysis, not demanding precise information, and providing robust conclusions with wide support from the group (possibly with a tolerance). Not only may this prevent unnecessary conflict (there is a many-to-one correspondence between parameter values and conclusions), but it may guide the group decision-making process. Moreover, the feedback each member receives as what can accepted by the other members can facilitate issuing proposals (e.g. ''can we drop a 7 from consideration?'', ''can we agree that k 1 P k 2 ?'') and can encourage the convergence of opinions (unfortunately, it can also facilitate manipulation, but we are assuming that all group members are genuinely trying to reach consensus).
The focus of this paper has been directed to the aggregation of results, which seemed the most promising than the aggregation of inputs (parameter values), emphasizing the duality between shared results and shared conclusions, and the compromise between majority (a) and tolerance (e). Nevertheless, we believe that the aggregation of inputs deserves further research, namely on overcoming the difficulties in using nonconvex sets resulting from the aggregation, and helping the DMs in the cases where the aggregated set of acceptable inputs is empty. Anticipating such cases, VIP-G could be complemented with tools to deal with inconsistent systems of constraints (Chinneck, 1997) to propose alternatives to restore the consistency that could be accepted by the group.
The details concerning the communications module of the proposed GDSS are still a subject for future research, both at the client level and server level. The Internet offers excellent potential to support communications, and an interesting development for the future would be to implement VIP-G clients based on a Web interface, to take advantage of the usersÕ familiarity with browsers.
Furthermore, other decision support tools could be offered to use the knowledge about the inputs and outputs of all the DMs to compute some measures of the proximity among its members (e.g. comparing rankings, or computing distances among the centroids of T 1 ; . . . ; T K ) and their degree of indecisiveness (e.g. comparing the volumes of T 1 ; . . . ; T K ). Some of these tools might be available only to a facilitator, if there is one. Here also, there is a vast field for research.
Finally, at a more general level, there are two interesting items for future research: to study how to avoid manipulation of results (if possible), and to study whether (or how) a system like the proposed Group VIP Analysis may be used for negotiation support.
